The army of the Nawab of Awadh Shuja-ud-Dawla Qaraqoyunlu (Ashirbadi Lal Srivastava, 1945)

The army of the Nawab of Awadh Shuja-ud-Dawla Qaraqoyunlu

The army that came to Shuja as an inheritance from his father was, besides a powerful park of artillery, about fifty thousand strong, next only to the imperial forces at Delhi in number and efficiency. The most highly prized branch was cavalry which numbered about 20,000 picked horse, consisting mainly of Qizilbashes, Irani and Turani Mughals, and Hindu Rajputs and Nagas or Gosains, noted for their reckless bravery and contempt of death. It was well-equipped and well-paid, the salary of a trooper ranging from fifty to sixty rupees a month. But the infantry, though more numerous, was of much less consequence and was ill-equipped and poorly paid, the pay of a foot-soldier not exceeding ten or twelve rupees per month. The artillery was crude and cumbrous, essentially medieval and inefficient. Before his defeat at Buxar the wazir’s army was mercenary in character and lacked scientific training and discipline. The Mughals, dominated by greed for money and habitual love of plunder, were little amenable to rigorous discipline, were undependable in an hour of crisis, and fell on the baggage and effects of their master with as much avidity as on those of his enemy, whenever they could have an opportunity to do so. Their example had demoralizing effect on other troops and we find even the Nagas succumbing to the temptation of plunder in one of the battles. Thus the wazir’s army before 1765 was a medieval institution in its composition, organization, training and discipline and in the mercenary character of its troops and their out-of-date weapons.

There was, however, one small exception, namely, a contingent of about two hundred European troops, mostly French and some trained Indian sepoys with eight guns divided into eight small battalions under Samru, Gentil and Madec; but as they had been enlisted only a few months before the commencement of his memorable campaign against the English, they did not influence the nawab’s military policy till, at any rate, after the conclusion of the treaty of Allahabad in 1765.

Ashirbadi Lal Srivastava — Shuja-ud-Daulah. Vol. [02] (1765-1775) (1945)