The Bichaqchi Turks in
Kerman during WWI
On
August 12th came the first news of the Russian reverses in the West of Persia
and it served to raise the hopes and stimulate the activities of the Democrats.
General Sykes with his force was halted at Yezd and the question of its
diversion to Ispahan came into debate, and the “Kerman Column” had not yet arrived
at Bandar Abbas. In the meantime large bands of Fars robbers had become
extremely active on the Kerman-Yezd road, and warnings began to arrive from Sirjan
that the “German” prisoners were enjoying an undue amount of freedom and were
undesirably intimate with the people. Repeated orders to Shahzada Hussain to
start them off for Bandar Abbas were met by excuses of insecurity on the road
and insufficient escort. Arrangements were made from Kerman to raise the escort
to C8 men, funds were supplied, and orders were sent to start whatever the
state of the road, but the latter were traversed by instructions from Yezd to
locate the robbers and start when the road was clear. Considerable uneasiness
was felt in Kerman and His Majesty’s Consul consulted, on 19th
August, with Major Farran and the Sardar Nusrat. As the result of this
conference it was decided to send out Captain Merrill at once to Saidabad to
take over command of the prisoners and see that they set out at once for the
coast. He was provided with an escort by the Sardar Nusrat, but otherwise had
only some half dozen men of the old Gendarmerie with him. He rode through by
double stages to Saidabad, where he arrived on the evening of the 22nd
August and was welcomed by the Adl-us-Sultan, Sardar Nusrat’s brother, and
other local officials.
The
same night a party of Hussain Khan Buchaqchi’s men, obviously in pursuance of a
prearranged plan, entered the prisoner’s quarters, liberated them and carried
them off. No resistance was made by the various guards, and Shazada Hussain
accompanied his charges. There are considerable grounds for suspecting the
Adl-us-Sultan of complicity. He professes to have known that some such scheme
was in the air, but he did not warn Captain Merrill and he failed to inform him
of the prisoners’ escape until they had been gone for some time. Every
difficulty was then raised to attempting an immediate pursuit. The Adl is a
clever man and has, of course, got a plausible answer to all charges. Captain
Merrill is further convinced that the Sardar Nusrat forestalled his arrival,
which was intended to be surprise, by a special messenger who got off a few
hours before Captain Merrill on the road, was overtaken by him but again
disappeared. Other suspects are the Revenue Agent, Mirza Salih Khan and Agha
Murad Khan, the “friendly” chief of the Buchaqchis and cousin and habitat
“enemy” of Hussain Khan. The disloyalty of a large section of the Saidabad
population was proved by later events beyond dispute.
The
prisoners were taken to Qala Sang and thence to Balward, about 25 miles east of
Saidabad, and Merrill was left in rather an awkward predicament in the town,
surrounded by professed friends of whose bad faith he was convinced and whom he
more than suspected of designing to murder him or take him prisoner and bring
back the escaped prisoners in triumph.
From
Kerman he was separated by 100 miles partly of mountain track, which was later
watched by Hussain Khan’s men, and letters, when not robbed, took at least five
days to pass by a detour via Pariz.
His
first letter bringing news of these events reached Kerman on 27th
August and steps were at once taken by Major Farran to send out all the men in
any degree trained and reliable whom he had at his disposal. These were
practically limited to a small body of the old Gendarmerie. His Majesty’s
Consul took steps to publish offers of rewards for the delivery up of the
prisoners and their rescuers. Major Farran suggested to General Sykes that his
column should remain in Yezd till the situation cleared, but it had already
been decided that this column should go on to Ispahan and in pursuance of this
it marched out of Yezd on the 28th August. Urgent instructions were
however immediately sent out to Lieutenant Fraser and Captain Wagstaff, who
were believed to be bringing up forces of 200 men and 2 guns and 120 Infantry
respectively (in fact about 140 men, and 2 guns, and 95 Infantry) from Bandar
Abbas, to deflect their march from Baft to Saidabad, if local information did
not show the risk of encountering superior forces to be too great; and to take
all possible steps to recapture the prisoners and secure Sirjan from falling
into the hands of any hostile combination. It was recommended that the 2,000
rifles and 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition which it was believed Lieutenant
Fraser was bringing up should be left under a guard of 100 rifles in a strong
place in Baft. Eventually Lieutenant Fraser decided to bring up his valuable
convoy direct to Kerman, deposit it there, and then march back to Saidabad. In
view of the smallness of his force and its enfeebled condition after a very
trying march in the low country this was probably a correct decision.
Fortunately no attempt was made by the enemy to attack him when crossing the
Kafanu-Zarchu range and he brought his force and caravan safely into Kerman on
2nd September. Leaving sick men and horses behind, he started again
for Saidabad on the 6th September.
Arrangements
were made His Majesty’s Consul through the Sardar Nusrat to have the Bid Khair
pass picquetted by tribes who were supposed to be friendly during the passage
of the troops, and this service was satisfactorily rendered by the Khurasani
and Luri headmen. Meanwhile Captain Wagstaff with his 95 rifles had reached
Baft on 4th September and, though much disappointed at finding that
Fraser’s party had gone on to Kerman, he did not hesitate to direct his march
straight on Saidabad. On the way he learned that Hussain Khan and the
ex-prisoners were on the move from the Chahargumaz Mountains to the
Kuh-i-Khajui (“Khavich” on the maps) and would cross his line of march. No
genuine assistance, however, could be obtained from the Afshar or local
inhabitants either in the way of information or armed forces, as their object
appears to have been to acquire merit by pretended services and misleading
information which would at the same time ensure Hussain Khan an unimpeded line
of flight. They succeeded in the latter aim, and the fugitive party got
through. Captain Wagstaff followed hard on their heels on the 10th
and was eventually seconded by Lieutenant Fraser who left Saidabad at 1 A.M. on
the 11th with his 30 sowars and some Sirjan levies, but his own
Infantry could not hope to overtake mounted men and Lieutenant Fraser was too
late. The pursuit was maintained as far as Zavaru by Lieutenant Fraser and up
to Aval Chahquli by Captain Wagstaff, places which lie to the south-west and
south-east respectively of the Kuh-i-Khajui.
On
the 13th September the forces concentrated, and took up their
quarters, in Saidabad. Active reconnaissance work was kept up but nothing of
importance occurred until the 27th September. Rumours were heard
that Hussain Khan was collecting men in Fars territory and intended to make an
attack on the British Force in Sirjan, but on the evening of the 27th
it was reported that he was far off at Qala Ghaibi. The detail of what happened
as learned from different sources are rather confused. The Adl-us-Sultan makes
out that he warned the British officers of the probability of Hussain Khans’
attacking that night and that it was arranged that he was to withdraw his men
from certain burjs which were to be occupied by Indian troops, that it was
their failure to occupy these forts that enabled Hussain Khan with his men to
slip into the town at night. Captain Wagstaff, however, says that the Adl had
given him definite information that Hussain Khan was far off, and he is certain
that the Adl knew of, and was privy to, Hussain Khan’s attempt. In any case,
early next morning, Hussain Khan was in possession of certain burjs and houses
in the town from which he opened fire on the Indian troops. Fighting went on
all day and it was estimated that the enemy, who consisted largely of
townspeople, numbered the best part of 300. They were all behind walls, while
the Indians were more or less in the open, and it was only owing to the bad
shooting of the Persians that our casualties amounted to only about half a
dozen Indians. It had been taken for granted that the Indian troops could not
and would not fight and when evening came and it had been proved that quite the
reverse was the case Hussain Khan realising that his cuop had failed, broke out of the town with a party of 20 or 30
sowars. He was heavily fired on but without effect. Some, however, say that
Hussain Khan himself stayed in the town over the night. The Austrian Lorenz was
almost certainly present during the attack, and according to some Bruggmann was
also there. It is said that communication went on between Agha Murad Khan the
:loyal” Buchaqchi, the Adl-us-Sultan and Hussain Khan. No effective assistance
was received from Agha Murad’s men nor from the local levies who had been
raised by Captain Merrill to the number of 300 or 400. Few of the latter were
even seen during the day, but it does not appear that they actually joined the
enemy. This small action may be regarded in the light of a British victory. It
convinced the local inhabitants that Indians led by British officers would
fight as no rabble of their own much-vaunted tribal warriors would, and that
their own marksmanship was unequal to picking off British officers even at
short ranges: and it must have convinced the ex-prisoners and Hussain Khan that
even with the advantage of cover and an assisting population the possession of
Saidabad was not to be won even by a coup
de main from a handful of Indian troops, with one small obsolete M.L.
Mountain gun, operating more or less in the open.
After
the fight the policy of active reconnaissances in force was continued by
Captain Wagstaff, but the enemy was careful to keep well out of danger’s way in
the Chahargumbaz mountains. It was impossible to take them by surprise, as they
were kept well informed of our movements by friends in the town, probably
including Agha Murad. On one expedition an Austrian, by name “Chope,” who had
got separated from his companions, was found and recaptured at Balward. Hussain
Khan and his guests remained in the Chahargumbaz country until driven out after
a few weeks by the cold, when they moved across to Kuhistan. Later Bruggmann
and some others appear to have gone to Darab. In the attack it was stated that
Hussain Khan was accompanied by a contingent of Kuhistanis, men of Shaikh Abul
Hassan’s. That the ex-prisoners are on some sort of terms both with the
Khistanis and Baharlu is evident, but it is not clear that they have received
any armed assistance from them, and it is said that Shahzada Husssain was later
robbed and reduced to destitution in Kuhistan, but this is uncertain/ One thing
which has been abundantly proved however is that the sympathies of the tribes,
whether active or passive, are substantially with the Germans and Turks. Our
Buchaqchi “Allies” have played a very ambiguous part, and it has not been a
helpful one. The active elements in the town have no better, and the Afshars,
while professing good will, entirely failed to make any move towards capturing
the prisoners which they could probably have easily done. Offers of rewards
have proved absolutely useless. His Majesty’s Consul at once offered 500 tomans
apiece for Hussain Khan, Ali Khan, Shahzada Hussain and the Turk, any European,
and the offer for the Turk was later raised to 2,000 tomans. A special offer
was also made by His Majesty’s Consul to Gunj Ali Khan Afshar, of a lump sum of
5,000 tomans for the delivery of the principal personages, with an immediate
cash advance of 500 tomans for mobilisation expenses, if he would undertake the
job. He did not however go the length of even applying for the 500 tomans.
Why
local feeling should be so strongly on the enemy side is not easy to determine
with certainly. There is little doubt however that, in August, the populace of
Sirjan believed that the Turkish advance was progressing unchecked. It was
current that they were already in Yezd. The Russians are undoubtedly an object
of fear and consequently of hate throughout Persia and we have associated
ourselves with them. The Democrat type of Persian appears to picture a Persia
emptied of Russians and British offering a happy hunting ground for his own
depredations. He does not reckon with the Germans and Turks as a permanent
factor, and so far as he has seen them their policy admirable suits his own
most vicious ambitions. After the hope of satisfying his own immediate
self-interest by looting, stealing and thieving ad lib, the Persian is undoubtedly influenced by the idea of the
solidarity of Islam, and when in this frame of mind he does not think of the Turks
as a Suni Heretic, nor as the historical enemy of Persia and transgressor of
its frontiers, but only as a brother Muslim. Even here and in the presence of
His Majesty’s Consul the “Ambassador” Obeidullah is always spoken of with a
latent feeling of respect. To judge from his letters he is an accomplished
Persian scholar, and he evidently knows how to appeal to such slight vein of
religious fanaticism as there is in the Persian and to the much deeper and more
general hostility to the European that lies at the bottom of every Persian’s
heart. Turk and German are a strong combination, each making god the defects of
the other.
The
part played by the people of the town was beyond all doubt, though it was
impossible to prove guilt against individuals, and it was necessary to take
notice of it. This Captain Wagstaff decided to do by imposing a general fine on
all the inhabitant of 15,000 tomans. The apportioning and collecting of this
fine was left to the local Persian authorities. 5,000 tomans was eventually remitted,
but the remaining 10,000 tomans was duly collected. His Majesty’s Consul at
once notified his approval of the measure to His Majesty’s Minister, and it is
a most curious fact that up to now, nearly five months after the imposition of
the fine, no attempt appears to have been made by the Persian Government to
raise questions or interfere. Various individuals protests have been received
by His Majesty’s Consul, and in a few cases a readjustment of the apportionment
has been effected, but in general the fine has been acquiesced in as the
unquestionably appropriate sequel to the episode; and its effect has been
wholly excellent. A protest was lodged with His Majesty’s Consul at Bandar
Abbas on behalf of a number of Laris, through one Haji Mehdi Lari, who, His Majesty’s Consul at Bandar Abbas says,
has rendered considerable service to the British. The connection of these
Laris, of whom 60 arrived armed in Saidabad the day before the attack, with
Hussain Khan’s coup, is however one
of the least doubtful facts in the whole affair. They probably only offer
another instance of the Persian fixed policy f securing oneself against all
contingencies by playing on both sides at the same time.
After
the failure of Hussain Khan’s coup no
further trouble of a serious nature was experienced by the troops in Sirjan up
to the end of the year. The presence of the Adl-us-Sultan and Agha Murad Khan
was however felt to be inconvenient. They both professed devotion and made much
of small apparent services, but the services seem often to have consisted in
overcoming difficulties created by themselves, and it is believed that they
were both in frequent friendly communication with the enemy. His Majesty’s
Consul consequently had them both summoned to Kerman by the Governor-General
and Sardar Nusrat. Delay in conforming with the summons ensued, but the Adl
eventually came in and Agha Murad was later brought in by Major Farran, who
made a tour, in November, through Baft and Sirjan. Both have since remained,
apparently contentedly, in the town.
Besides
the suspicion, amounting to certainty, that the Adl knew more about the escape
and movements of the prisoners than he should have done, he is also to be
blamed for having failed in his mission to recover the money and property
robbed from the Germans. There is reason to believe that the failure was more
apparent than real and that the Adl returned to Kerman a richer man than he
left it
Agha
Murad Khan is also believed to have rewarded himself liberally for his
services. On his return the Adl lost no time in pressing his merits and
services on the notice of His Majesty’s Consul, but he met with a rather chilly
reception. His Majesty’s Consul further counselled the Sardar Nusrat to arrange
for his brother to leave Kerman for a year or two. The advice was not taken,
but it is now always open to His Majesty’s Consul to sanction the enquiries
into the conduct of the Adl in regard to these two maters, which the Prince,
for purposes of his own, has repeatedly urged on him. The matter has been under
consideration for some time (3rd March 1917) and the hunting of the
Adl presents attractions, but also countervailing difficulties.
Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Political
Residency for the Year 1916, Delhi: Superintendent Government Printing, 1917, pp.
25―29.
No comments:
Post a Comment