The Qashqais during the Constitutional Revolution (J. H. Bill, 1910)

The Qashqais during the Constitutional Revolution

The prestige and self-confidence of this important tribe and of its leader Sowlet-ed-Dowleh has increased greatly during the year. As already noted they have displayed an unanimity unprecedented in the history of the tribe, and the consolidation of Sowlet’s authority, due to the practical disappearance of his brother Zeigham-ed-Dowleh from the tribal politics, is sufficient by itself to render the tribe twice as formidable as it has been in the past.

It is freely alleged that Saham-ed-Dowleh’s failure to procure Sowlet’s dismissal was due to the latter having bribed Sipahdar, and it would certainly seem improbable that Sardar Assad, with whom he is on the worst of terms, would not have seized the opportunity to dismiss him, had he not met with strong resistance from his colleague.

As a result it is doubtful whether any attention would now be paid by the Kashgais to orders from Tehran dismissing Sowlet-ed-Dowleh, and it seems far more likely that the only result would be to provoke the latter to open rebellion.

Not only the Kashgais, but the Farsis in general are accustomed to speak contemptuously of the present Government as “those (variously qualified) Bakhtiaris in Tehran,” and it is by no means improbable that Sowlet, cautious as he is by nature, may, during the ensuing year, be driven by public opinion within his tribe to some overt act of hostility against the ascendancy of the Bakhtiari, whom every Kashgai considers inferior to his tribe both in courage and in numbers. It is safe to say that very little of the old time prestige of Tehran and the Shah’s Government has descended to the persons now in power, who are regarded rather as a band of unusually successful robbers than as the representatives of duly constituted authority.

The tribe were on the whole, well in hand throughout the year, although the Darshuri and Farsimadan sections made themselves conspicuous in the autumn by extensive damage to the telegraph line between Dastarjin and Kazerun, and by maltreating the Armenian signaller at the latter place, the result being a total interruption which showed signs of continuing indefinitely. I consequently paid a visit to Sowlet’s camp and was assured that all the damage was being done by a contumacious Kashgai chief in order to discredit his (Sowlet’s) authority; but this is hardly credible, as the damage was too extensive to have been done by a small party, and moreover it ceased completely the moment Sowlet issued orders to that effect; I have consequently little doubt that the damage was done with his knowledge as a conspicuous demonstration of the incapacity of Saham-ed-Dowleh to keep order.

In the same way the participation of the Kashgai in the Russian robbery must be considered unproved, but no one doubts that the robbers, whoever they were, at least considered themselves safe from any retaliation from Sowlet, if they did not act with his knowledge.

A member for the Kashgai is now sitting in the Tehran Medjliss in the person of Haji Muhammad Kerim Khan Kashguli, a connection and devoted adherent of Sowlet. He told me of his intended departure and said with a great laugh: “They call me a representative (vakil) of the Kashgai, when everybody knows I am only the officer (Mamour) of Sowlet-ed-Dowleh. How in the world could the Kashgai choose a vakil?”

Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the Year 1909, Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1911, pp. 24―25.